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REGULATORY MECHANISMS OF SECURITIES
TRADING IN MALAYSIA
(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INSIDER TRADING)
Mohd. Ishaque Qureshit
Abstract: In 1993, Malaysia established a Securities Commission to make the
securities markets more secure and efficient, and to better control insider trading. This
Article first presents an overview of the structure of the Securities Commission and the
responsibilities of the various divisions and officers. Second, it reviews the common law
and statutory law on which the Commission and other government agencies must rely to
regulate the securities markets.
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Economic Justification
B. Public Interest Justification
C. Socio-Political Justification
1. Self Regulation
2. State Regulation
3. Co-Regulation
II. NEW DEVELOPMENTS: REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. Issues and Investment Division
1. Securities Issues Department
2. Take-overs and Mergers Department
3. Trust and Investment Management Department
B. Market Supervision Division
1. Surveillance and Compliance Department
t Mohd Ishaque Qureshi, Assistant Professor, Kulliyyah (Faculty) of Laws, International Islamic
University, Malaysia. The author would like to thank Professor Emeritus Tan Sri Datuk Ahmad Bin Mohd
Ibrahim, Sheikh/Dean Kulliyyah of Laws IIUM for his invaluable help, comments, and encouragement at
an hour of diminishing courage because of the paucity of time, in the preparation of the updated version of
"Insider Trading: Prevention and Cure."
"Insider Trading: Prevention and Cure" was initially published in HUM Law Journal, Vol. 3 No. I
Jan. 1993. The author is also thankful to the Editor of HUM Law Journal, Dr. Mohsin Hingun, who has
very kindly consented for the reproduction of the above article in its updated form in the Pacific Rim Law
& Policy Journal.
Initially, the above article was published before the establishment of the Securities Commission,
the most potential, single central regulatory authority. The author in the present article endeavors to
portray the existing regulatory mechanism in the field of securities trading in Malaysia.
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
2. Investigation and Enforcement Department
3. Licensing Department
C. Research and Development Division
D. Finance and Administration Division
III. INSIDER TRADING
A. An Overview
B. Conception of "Insider" and "Insider Trading"
C. Prevention of Insider Trading
1. The Common Law Approach
2. Statutory Approach
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The government's commitment, enshrined in the VI Plan, to revital-
ize the capital market by regulating securities trading materialized in 1993
with the establishment of the securities commission in Malaysia. The
purpose of its establishment was to bring together under one single author-
ity the various fragmented regulatory functions which were vested in
different regulatory bodies up until that point.2
The most important question that may arise is whether regulation of
the securities industry is needed. It should be mentioned from the very
beginning that an unregulated market cannot secure socio-economic goals
sought by the nation. Therefore, the need of regulation has been based on
the following grounds: 3 economic justification, a public justification, and a
socio-political justification.
A. Economic Justification
A securities market is one of the most important sources of a
country's economic growth. It serves the vital economic function of
I In 1988, a task force was set up by the then Minister of Finance to formulate recommendations for
the development of the securities market. In 1990, on the basis of the recommendation of the task force,
the Sixth Malaysia Plan also included as one of its objectives, the establishment of a central authority to
regulate and develop a capital market. SEC. COMM'N ANN. REP. 21 (1993) (background of the
establishment of the securities commission).
2 With the establishment of the securities commission, the Capital Issues Committee (CIC) and the
Panel on Take-overs and Mergers were dissolved. The securities commission subsequently adopted the
guidelines and code of the CIC and the Panel. Id. at 3.
3 See id. at 108-109.
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enabling business enterprise to obtain long term equity capital from the
securities market.
Malaysia, for example, in 1993 raised a total of RM4.5 billion of
equity capital on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange ("KLSE"), represent-
ing some nine percent of the projected fixed capital formation for that year. 4
To enable the securities market to serve its vital economic role of
efficiently allocating resources, information must be available so the invest-
ing public can determine the risk, return, and liquidity of investments. To
this end, the foremost objective of securities regulation is to ensure that a
mandatory disclosure system is available for the sale and trading of securi-
ties so that needed information is made available to them. An equally
important consideration is the integrity and systematic stability of the
securities markets which is very much linked with the vital interest of the
nation's economy. Large sums of money are invested by pension funds,
mutual funds and individual investors. Clearly, if securities markets were to
fail, i.e., if market intermediaries or participants fail to meet their obliga-
tions on a large scale, such failure could trigger devastating economic
consequences for the country as a whole. To avoid such circumstances, it is
in the nation's interest to ensure the security and integrity of the securities
market.
B. Public Interest Justification
The issuers of securities and market intermediaries have a natural
advantage over investors in the access to information and access to the
trading system. If the conduct of issuers and intermediaries is not regulated,
market manipulation or fraud would certainly result.
A 1961 survey answered by some 1,700 executive readers of the
Harvard Business Review supports this argument.5 When asked what they
would do if they acquired inside information: 61% would buy for
4 Id If one accepts that 1993 was a vintage year for the KLSE, the fact still remains that, for the
three decades between 1962 and 1992, funds raised in the capital market have grown at an average rate of
16 percent.
5 See Raymond C. Baumhart, How Ethical are Businessmen?, 39 HARV. BUS. REv. 6 (196 1). The
question posed in the survey was:Imagine that you are a member of the board of directors of a large corporation. At a board
meeting you learn of an impending merger with a smaller company which has had an unprofitable year,
and whose stock is presently selling at a price so low that you are certain it will rise when news of the
merger be comes public knowledge. What would you do? Would you buy some stock? or tell to a friend?
or tell your brother? or do nothing?
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themselves; 46% would tell a friend; 11% would tell their broker; and only
29% would do nothing. Therefore, approximately 72% of executives, when
put in a position of temptation to gain from the use of inside information,
would succumb.
Although over 34 years have passed since the above survey was
conducted, one cannot help but suspect the same result in any of the coun-
tries of the world, keeping in view the human nature of common men
involved in securities trading who have access to confidential price sensi-
tive information. Thus, the unregulated securities industry would likely be
detrimental to the interest of the people at large.
C. Socio-Political Justification
For the restructuring of a caring society there should be equitable
distribution of the nation's wealth which will make the people fully recep-
tive to the concept of nation building through the National Development
Policy. This Policy requires the spirit of competitiveness. The securities
industry is not an exception to this principle. In this industry, regulations
could be used to strengthen the competitive fiber of the local securities
industry by enhancing internationally accepted mores and
practices-practices that have already been established in Malaysia. At the
same time, Malaysian market intermediaries may be encouraged to venture
abroad. Emerging securities markets have received favorable attention
from the investing world as it is likely that what we have witnessed over the
last few years is but the start of a trend consonant with the inflow of foreign
funds and the inevitable globalization of the country's securities industry.
Therefore, the nation must invest not only in the infrastructure and human
resources, but also in a regulatory system that will keep ahead of the pace of
development that may be witnessed in the years to come.
The principle of balancing competing interests between liberalization
and regulation in the securities industry must be maintained to ensure the
existence of a fair market, systematic stability, smooth functioning of the
market, an adequate level of investor protection, innovation, and competi-
tion in securities trading.6 This balancing principle is evident in the
Malaysian model of regulation. The securities markets are allowed to
develop freely but the systemic risks are avoided by the regulatory frame-
work. The need to develop a market which is free from legal constraints has
6 Supra note 1, at I 10- II.
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passed, but the interests of the market participants should be protected. The
desire of the government to regulate the industry, and the wishes of the
industry to be self-regulating (as well as the promotion and protection of the
domestic market and the promotion of a market which is globally competi-
tive) crystallize into the Malaysian model of regulations of securities
trading. Thus, an effective, consistent, and coherent regulatory policy has
been contained in the model to allow the market having regulatory measures
to be consistent with the objectives of regulation.
In Malaysia, the role of regulatory authorities in securities trading is
not only to police the market to ensure discipline, but also to develop,
promote, and advise the market.7 It cannot be denied that the regulating
activities are very costly, but indispensable. Competition, duplication, and
confusion between various authorities should be avoided as they lead to
lesser investor protection, lower regulatory standards, and increased cost to
the securities industry.
Three modes of regulations are inextricably interwoven in the fiber of
the regulatory framework in Malaysia: self regulation, state regulation, and
co-regulation.
1. Self Regulation
Self-regulation is regulation by the industry itself. The advantages of
self regulation are flexibility, expertise, acceptability, and cost effective-
ness. The disadvantage is public suspicion that the promotion of self
interest may stifle competition in securities trading. Furthermore, self-
regulators may not have the statutory powers to deal with market failure or
cases of serious fraud in the industry.
2. State Regulation
Public control of securities trading is a necessary evil because wider
policy objectives can only be established by the government. State regula-
tion allows action to be taken in cases when self regulation may not work
and allows the state to use the full force of its criminal justice system to
ensure compliance with the law. However, government regulation is a
departure from the principle of private control of decision making in the
market place, which may be a disadvantage. Heavy-handed state
7 Supra note i, at 112.
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regulations can substitute for the judgment of the regulators. Such regula-
tions can reduce efficiency, increase costs, and decrease the spirit of
innovation and competition.
3. Co-Regulation
It may be noted that both self regulation and state regulation have
their fair share of benefits and shortcomings. A system of co-regulation
whereby regulatory powers are shared by the industry and enlightened
regulators in the public domain enables the strengths of government regula-
tions. The success of the industry depends on the co-existence between the
industry and the public sector. Most importantly, only a system of co-
regulation ensures the checks and balances which are necessary in any
regulatory structure. In a system of co-regulation, the division of regulatory
functions must be clear and concise. Broad regulatory principles must be
accepted and adopted by both regulatory authorities as well as the traders.
For example, it must be accepted by both of them that the securities market
must operate in the public interest.
It is clear that an unregulated market cannot secure specially defined
economic, social, and political goals, whereas an over regulated market will
stifle the market and may eventually result on its self-destruction. Having
identified clear, consistent, and coherent policies, both government and
industry regulators should work on a basis of co-regulation, which helps the
market to be efficient and healthy, and enables the government to achieve
its various goals. Mutual trust is a necessary ingredient in the successful
scheme of co-regulation.
II. NEW DEVELOPMENTS: REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
In 1988, a task force was set up by the then Minister of Finance to
formulate recommendations to revitalize the capital markets in Malaysia. In
1990, the sixth Malaysian Plan stated the establishment of a securities
commission, a central authority to regulate and develop the capital market
as one of its objectives. In 1991, Dato Sri Anwar Ibrahim, on his appoint-
ment as Minister of Finance, swiftly voiced his full support for the
immediate establishment of the securities commission.
Finally, on March 1, 1993, the Securities Commission came into
being with four Divisions divided into fourteen Departments. Since then,
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the commission has been performing regulatory functions. From March to
December 1993, the commission considered 192 applications of corporate
proposals, 61 submissions pertaining to the code on take-overs and mergers,
and 25 applications on investment management schemes. The success of
the commission within these first ten months could be seen in five success-
ful prosecutions for short selling in Union Paper Holdings Berhad
("UPHB"). There had never been any such prosecution before the estab-
lishment of the commission.8 A short account of the regulatory bodies of
the commission follows.
A. Issues and Investment Division
With the establishment of the securities commission, the Capital
Issues Committee ("CIC") and the Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers
("TOM") were dissolved. The Issues and Investment Division ("liD")
assumed all functions previously performed by the above two bodies. The
main functions of the IID are to regulate the issues of securities by public
limited companies, the listing of such securities on the stock exchange, the
take-overs and mergers of companies, and all matters relating to Unit Trusts
as well as other collective investment schemes. Specific guide lines have
been issued for the operation of the following three departments of the
Division, the Securities Issues Department, the Takeovers and Mergers
Department, and the Investment Management Department.
1. Securities Issues Department
The Securities Issues Department ("SID") plays a key role in regulat-
ing all primary offers of securities in the Malaysian Capital Market. In
carrying out its role, the Department seeks to safeguard the interests of
investors, particularly minority share holders of public companies.
The commission views seriously any material deviation in the infor-
mation disclosed in prospectuses. The commission will continue to publicly
reprimand errant listed companies and their directors, as and when circum-
stances dictate. Public reprimands were issued by the commission to the
following companies for various shortcomings during the period between
March 1, 1993 and December 31, 1993.
8 Supra note 1, at 4.
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Table A9
Cases in which the Securities Commission issued public reprimands to the
following errant companies between March 1 and December 31, 1993:
Company
UCM Industrial
Corporation
Berhad
Berjaya Textile
Berhad
Samanda
Holdings Berhad
Date of Issues
July 2, 1993
July 2, 1993
October 11, 1993
Reason
Material deviation in actual pretax
profit achieved relative to forecast
pretax profit.
Material deviation in utilization of
proceeds of rights issue.
Material deviation in utilization of
rights issue proceeds and deviation
in actual pretax profit achieved
relative to forecast pretax profit.
2. Takeovers and Mergers Department
The main function of this department is to administer the Malaysian
Code on take-overs and mergers to ensure efficient monitoring of these
matters.
3. Trust and Investment Management Department
TIM, as an integral part of the IID, plays an important role in
overseeing all matters relating to unit/property trusts and investment
management schemes. One of the main functions of the TIM is to consider
applications for the setting up of unit trusts and property trusts, as well as
other forms of fund management, and the issue and offer for sale of such
instruments to the public.
B. Market Supervision Division
The Market Supervision Division works as the enforcement arm of
the commission. It comprises three departments, namely, Surveillance and
Compliance, Investigation and Enforcement, and Licensing.
9 SEC. COMM'N ANN. REP. 53 (1993).
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The Division has general oversight of the stock exchange, the stock
market, and the market intermediaries under the Securities Industry Act of
1983 ("SIA"). The Division has officers of varied experience, from the
legal and accounting professions, the Royal police, the KLSE, the Bank
Negara Malaysia, and the Registrar of Companies. The Division benefits
from its balance and mixed expertise in carrying out its activities, which
cover: the analysis of trading patterns and data and the taking of
appropriate action, general oversight of the KLSE, carrying out raids and
the seizure of documents, and the initiation of prosecution by the Division's
own prosecuting officer. Many of the Division's activities for 1993 were
conditioned by the extremely active stock market. An incidence of short
selling cases was handled by the division, as a consequence of the unusual
market movement of the UPHB shares in June 1993.
A brief account of all three Departments of this Division follows:
1. Surveillance and Compliance Department (SCD)
The most important function of this department is the supervision and
monitoring of the activities of the stock exchange. In carrying out its
activities, it constantly monitors the movement of shares traded on the
KLSE. In this respect, close liaison is established with the KLSE, espe-
cially with the AWAS and Listing Departments. One of the most important
areas initially addressed was the forging of a close working relationship
with the KLSE on the basis of the KLSE acting as a front line self regula-
tory agency. A constant dialogue is now established with the KLSE. In
matters pertaining to its functions, the KLSE is expected to act as more than
a market operator. MSD acts as regulator of last resort, although it has not
hesitated to intervene directly when necessary, or where speed is of the
essence in particular circumstances.
Moreover, during the middle of the year, the Department's officers
were also actively involved in the preliminary investigation of the UPHB
case, and provided the necessary technical assistance and support in the
detailed analysis of trading data and patterns pertaining to the counter.
Thus, the department generally provide back up and technical personnel to
the Investigation and Enforcement Department in addition to its primary
functions.
As a necessary component of the departments' surveillance and
compliance functions, officers of the Department devoted serious attention
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to the activities of stock brokerage companies. The Department collected
information in the first half of 1993 by sending their personnel to visit
numerous stock brokerage companies.
2. Investigation and Enforcement Department
This is the second most important department of this division. The
statutory functions of the commission which fall within the preview of MSD
under section 15(1) of the Securities Commission Act of 1993, such as
suppressing illegal, dishonorable, and improper practices in dealing in
securities trading, are done by this department. In performing these func-
tions, the department acts as the primary investigative arm of the
commission, collecting evidence to support prosecution for breaches of
various provisions of securities laws.
The investigating officer of the commission is empowered by the
enforcement and investigation provisions in the Securities Commission Act
of 1993 to investigate any offenses under that Act, the Securities Industry
Act of 1983, and the Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act of 1991,
as well as the Futures Industry Act of 1993. The enforcement and investi-
gation provisions are important as they enable an investigating officer in
carrying out an investigation or inspection to enter into any place or
building, to require individuals to produce documents, and to appear before
an investigation officer to be questioned orally. It is by virtue of this
arrangement that the commission has exercised its power to investigate and
to prosecute the related offenses under the 1983 Security Industry Act
("SIA"). Thus, MSD with the help of its two departments is doing the task
of investigating improper or prohibited market practices which can create a
false market for securities and enable persons involved in such securities to
derive unfair advantages. The improper or prohibited market practices can
be classified as follows:
* illegal trading;
* short selling;
* market manipulation;
* insider trading;
* improper utilization of proceeds from rights issue; and
* improper corporate disclosure and dissemination of false
information.
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The director of the Market Supervision Division ("MSD") is respon-
sible for coordinating the Division's resources to ensure that efficient and
effective investigations are carried out.
The chairman of the commission is empowered to appoint any of its
officers to conduct the prosecution under section 39(2) of the Securities
Commission Act of 1993 ("SCA"). In exercising this power under section
39(2), the chairman as of December 1993 appointed three officers to
conduct prosecution of offenses coming within the purview of the commis-
sion. However, any prosecution of offenses relating to the securities
industry within the ambit of the Securities Industry Act of 1983 (section
126) or the Futures Industry Act of 1993 (section 93), must first be endorsed
with the Public Prosecutor's consent to prosecute. Under section 376 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, the Attorney General is the Public Prosecutor and
in his absence or inability, the Solicitor General shall act as the Public
Prosecutor.
During the period from March 1993, through December 1993, the
Department referred nine investigation papers to the Public Prosecutor for
his consent. These cases related to the offense of short selling UPHB shares
under section 41(1) of the SIA. Out of nine cases referred, the Public
Prosecutor consented to prosecute only five cases. Immediately upon
processing the said consents from the Attorney General, the Commission
pressed charges against all five short sellers in various courts depending on
where the offenses took place. All the accused persons pleaded guilty to the
charges and paid the fines imposed by the respective courts. The fines
ranged from RM10,000 to RM100,000.
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Table BIO
Cases prosecuted under section 41 (1) of the Securities Industry Act of 1983
for short selling since December 31, 1993
Date Accused Court No. of
shares
Fines imposed/status
Sept. 22, Yap Swee
1993 Yeow
Sept. 24, Mustapha
1993 Ibrahim
Sept. 30, Wong Hua
1993 Seh
Jalan Duta,
Sessions Court
Ampang,
Session Court
Kuching,
Session Court
Oct. 21, Ho Tong Johor Bahru,
1993 Leng Sessions Court
Dec. 10
and Dec.
21, 1993
Koay Chee Penang,
Him Sessions Court
20,000 RM100,000 in default
Units six months
imprisonment.
10,000 RM90,000, in default
Units nine months
imprisonment
30,000 RM12500 in default
Units three months
imprisonment
2,000 RM 10,000, in default
Units two months
imprisonment
6,000 RM40,000 in default
Units nine months
imprisonment
In view of the increasing internationalization and globalization of the
securities market, the Division has also actively pursued the development
and promotion of information sharing arrangements and cooperative rela-
tionships with regulators abroad, formally and informally. In addition, as a
part of its efforts to up grade and enhance the level of competency and
professionalism among its staff, the commission has also introduced various
training and attachment programs from the MSD staff, both locally and
abroad. In this connection, the officers of the MSD have attended training
programs at SIMEX in Singapore, the Australian Securities Commission
and the American Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").
10 Id. at 66.
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3. Licensing Department
A licensing officer ("LO"), appointed by the Minister of Finance, is
responsible for the issuance of the relevant licenses under the Securities
Industry Act of 1983 as well as under the Futures Industry Act of 1993.
C. Research and Development Division
The function of this Division is to develop the local capital market
with the help of its various departments: the Regulations and Law Reform
Department, the Product Development Department, the Economic Research
Department, and the Information Technology Department.
The Division, in coordination with its various departments, especially
the Regulations and Law Reform Department, reviews the regulatory
framework governing the securities and futures industry. The review
focuses on the determination of the underlying policies of existing laws and
regulations, the identification of weaknesses and deficiencies in the regula-
tory frame work, and the submission of legal reform proposals to the
Commission.
The Product Development Department is designed to promote and
ensure the efficiency, integrity, and competitiveness of Malaysian's finan-
cial futures market, to monitor and encourage the development of new
capital market and derivative instruments, to investigate the means to
protect the investors' interest, and to create commercial certainty and reduce
business costs.
The Economic Research Department provides economic, industrial,
and corporate information to the Commission. The main function of the
department is the preparation of weekly and monthly market reports for the
information of the Commission. These reports also cover the performance
of other stock markets, including Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, and New
York.
The Information and Technology Department ("IT") is a critical
component for the success of the Commission. The important function of
the department is to develop and implement an efficient and effective
information system, which supports the strategic objectives and other
operations of the commission. As such, it caters to the commission's
internal information needs, as well as supports the Commission in its role as
a regulator.
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D. Finance and Administration Division
This is a support division that comprises the Administration and
Human Resources Department, the Finance and Accounts Department, the
Library Unit, and the Security Unit. The main functions of this division are
to give maximum support to the other divisions and top management
through the procurement and maintenance of materials, development of
human resources, financing, provision of library and information services,
and provision of security for the Commission as a whole.
The library unit is still in its infancy. Its collection includes reports,
thirty volumes of seminar and conference proceedings, and a few titles of
journals and magazines. Apart from the standard library services, the
library is planning to introduce several technology-based informational
services, including a computerized library integrated system. An integrated
library package will be selected and installed in the future to provide fast,
organized, and accurate information storage. I I
III. INSIDER TRADING
A. An Overview
Corporate bodies have a vital role to play in the promotion of busi-
ness and industry in all parts of the world. The lifeblood of such bodies is
provided by securities 12 (shares, debentures, etc.) which are bought and sold
in stock exchanges. Like any market place, people will be more inclined to
use stock exchanges if they believe that the prices correctly represent the
value of what is bought and sold. A person who buys something which
I1 Id at 86.
12 The definition of "securities" as provided under Part 1(2) of the Securities Industry (Amendment)
Act, 1993 reads, "[S]ecurities means debentures, stocks and shares in a public company or corporation, or
bonds of any government or of anybody, corporate or unincorporate, and includes any right or option in
respect there of and any interest in unit trust schemes:"
The definition of the phrase "on stock exchange" as provided in §.89(5)(b) of the Act is as follows:
"to deal in the securities of that corporation in the expectation that, if this information becomes generally
known the price of the securities of that other corporation on stock exchange might be materially affecteol."
An argument can be made that this definition covers only the situation of a listed public company.
It may also be noted that the British Columbia Supreme Court in Pelling v. Pelling, 130 D.L.R. (3d)
761 (1981) refused to limit an analogous provision in the above manner. But in Singapore, the phrase "on
stock exchange" has been removed and also no reference is made to public companies. See Walter Woon,
The Statutory Control of Insider Trading--S 103, Securities Industry Act, 1986, 28 MALAYAN L.R. 275
(1986). Whether or not our Malaysian courts would adopt the Pelling v. Pelling approach remains to be
seen.
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turns out to be worth less than the price he has paid for it will feel
aggrieved. So will a person who sells something for less than its real value.
Deals in a market are more likely to be at a price correctly reflecting value if
the information used in valuation is available to both buyers and sellers.
Such information in modem corporate literature is called "confidential price
sensitive information" until it is known to the people at large. Those who
obtain such information by virtue of their office in order to affect the price
of securities to their own advantage are called "insiders." The purchase or
sale of securities by such persons on the basis of confidential price sensitive
information which has not been made public is called "insider trading" or
"insider dealing."
The misuse of confidential price sensitive information by unscrupu-
lous insiders is likely to shake the confidence of potential investors in the
fairness and probity of the concerned corporate bodies and the financial
health of the economy, which is highly detrimental to the national interest
of a country. Attempts have therefore been made to curb the unhealthy
practices of insider trading by the civil remedies afforded by the common
law and criminal sanctions provided by statutory laws.
In this paper we will consider the effectiveness of the aforesaid civil
remedies and criminal sanctions in strengthening the legal regimen to
prevent the cancer of insider dealing from eating into the vitals of the
Malaysian economy. We will, therefore, examine the common law as well
as statutory approaches in dealing with the problem of "insider trading,"
particularly in the Malaysian context, where the securities industry is
governed by the following acts of Parliament:
(1) the Companies Act of 1965 ("CA");
(2) the Securities Industry Act of 1983 ("SIA");
(3) the Securities Industry (Central Depository) Act of 1991
("SI(CD)A");
(4) the Securities Commission Act of 1993 ("SCA"); and
(5) the Futures Industry Act of 1993 ("FIA").
There are five regulatory bodies responsible for the supervision and
management of the securities industry:
(1) The Securities Commission ("SC") established under the
Securities Commission Act of 1993 to regulate, and to advise, the
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Minister of Finance on all matters relating to the securities and
futures contract industries. Thus, the work of this body is
regulatory as well as advisory.
(2) The Registrar of Companies ("ROC"), which administers the
Companies Act of 1965 as well as the relevant provisions of the
Securities Industry Act of 1983 and the relevant provisions of the
SI(CD)A.
(3) The Licensing Officer (Securities/Futures Trading) of the
Ministry of Finance ("LO"), who is appointed by the Minister of
Finance and is responsible for the issuance of the relevant
licenses under the SIA as well as under the FIA.
(4) The Foreign Investment Committee ("FIC") which implements
the government's guide lines on the regulations of acquisition of
assets or interests, mergers or take-overs of companies, and is
responsible for major issues on foreign investment.
(5) The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange ("KLSE"), a self-regulated
organization with its own memorandum and articles of associa-
tion, which governs the conduct of its 119 members, which
include 41 corporate members and 78 individual members in
securities dealing. It is also responsible for the surveillance of
the market place, and for the enforcement of its listing require-
ments which spell out the criteria for listing, disclosure
requirements, and standards to be maintained by listed
companies.
The KLSE is approved by the Minister of Finance under the SIA to
conduct the business of a stock exchange in Malaysia. The affairs of the
KLSE are supervised by a nine member committee headed by an executive
chairman. Out of nine committee members, four, including the executive
chairman, are appointed by the Minister of Finance while the remaining five
members are elected from the members of KLSE. This is an example of co-
regulation which has increased the volume of trading activities in the
market place, according to information from KLSE's communication
department dated May 30, 1994. In 1990, it became mandatory for every
stock brokerage company to have a minimum paid-up capital of RM20
million, up from the RM2 million previously required. This requirement
was aimed at beefing up the financial strength of the brokerage houses to
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cope with the increasing scope of trading activities in the Kuala Lumpur
Stock Exchange.
Although the KLSE is the official stock exchange of the country
under the SIA, there is also the Bumiputra Stock Exchange ("BSE") which
was set up in 1969 for Bumiputra companies. 13 Presently, there are only
seven companies listed on the BSE and trading is generally inactive.
A question may arise regarding the application of the common law
when deciding cases that arise under the Malaysian Companies Act of 1965.
According to section 5 of the Civil Law Act, in the absence of any written
provision, common law may be applied. The Federal Court of Malaysia, in
a decided case, held that English common law will not be applied in the
presence of a codified law in Malaysia.14 It is only when there is no written
law that English law can be applied. Professor Sinnadurai is of the opinion
that even if there is an Act, the Court should look to the particular issue in
question to be decided. 15 He says, "It is seldom that a particular Act would
cover every aspect of law pertaining to a subject, unless the whole law on
the subject had been codified in the Act. To give a narrow interpretation to
section 5 would be to render the provision superfluous as most of the
matters specified in the section are now contained in some written law."' 16 It
is submitted that in the field of corporations the learned writer's opinion
may be followed.
B. Conception Of "Insider" And "Insider Trading"
The terms "insider" and "insider trading" or "insider dealing" have
not been used and defined in the Companies Act of 1965. However, from
the Companies (Amendment) Act of 1985, it may be inferred that insiders
include agents of the company, such as auditors, accountants, solicitors,
consultants, and officers of the stock exchange who acquire all confidential
information regarding the affairs of the company in their official capacity. 17
13 History of the Malaysian Securities Industry: The Regulatory Structure of the Malaysian
Securities Industry 3 (Apr. 30, 1994) (unpublished document, on file with the Pacific Rim Law & Policy
Journal).
14 Tan Moot Liang v. Limsoon Seng, 2 M.L.J. 60 (1974).
15 DATO' VISU SINNADUARI, THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE: CASES AND
COMMENTARY 11-12 (1987).
16 Id.
17 The concept of "insider" may be inferred from the following provisions: § 132 of the Companies
Act; § 132A, § 132B of the Companies Act incorporated by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1985; §
89(4) of Securities Industry Act, 1983; and § 340(IXa)(b) of the KLSE Listing Requirement.
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In dealing with the securities of the company, the insiders might use the
confidential price sensitive information for their own use or they may
provide such information to another person related to them for his benefit.
Both situations may be treated as insider dealing, which simply indicates the
misuse of confidential information. The profit obtained by such improper
use of confidential information is unfair. This confidential information
which has the effect of pushing up or pulling down the prices of the
companies' securities is called price sensitive information. The improper
use of such confidential price sensitive information by insiders is called
insider dealing.
Section 340(1)(b) of the KLSE listing requirement has given the conceptual
description of insiders as follows:
All persons who come into possession of material inside
information, before its public release, are considered insiders
for the purpose of the Exchange's disclosure policies. Such
persons include controlling shareholders, directors, officers and
employees, and frequently also include outside attorneys,
accountants, investment bankers, public relation advisers,
The term "Agent," as defined by § 132A(4) of the Companies Act as amended in 1985, is identical to
§ 89(4) of the Securities Industry Act of 1983. The definition is very broad in its scope which reads as
follows: "In this section-'agent' includes a banker, advocate and solicitor, auditor, accountant or stock
broker of the corporation and any person who is or at any time in the preceding six months has been
knowingly connected with the body corporate." Companies Act § 132A(4) (1985) (emphasis added).
The terms "includes" and "any person," as emphasized by us, suggest that the above definition is non-
exhaustive and that a person, who nevertheless does not fall within the categories as outlined, could still be
embraced by a general definition of agent of company.
The word "any person" requires further explanation based on the Supreme Court of New South Wales
decision Hooker Inv. Pty. Ltd. v. Baring Bros., 10 A.C.L.R. 462 (1986). The Court in the above case
interpreted the word "person" as used in N.S.W. PUB ACTS § 128 (1)-(3) of the Securities Code. The Court
observed:
[T]he whole scheme of the Act, as outlined earlier, goes in this direction. Bearing all those matters in
mind in my view the proper construction of sub-ss (I), (2) and (3) of s 128 is that it is only ifa natural
person has the information referred to in those sub-sections that the section applies.
Thus, the whole scheme of securities industry legislation envisages that it be construed as a natural
person in contrast to a corporate body.
However, the reasoning of the Hooker case was not accepted by E.C. Foenander, S.D.J., in Public
Prosecutor v Allan Ng Poh Meng, I M.L.J. v (1990) who held that the term "person" employed in § 103 of
the Singapore Securities Industry Act (Cap 289) (1985) must be read to include both the natural person as
well as a body corporate. It is submitted to the Malaysian Courts with due regard that the wider view of
Public Prosecutor v. Allan is preferable in comparison to the narrow view expressed in the Hooker case.
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advertising agencies, consultants, and other independent
contractors. The husbands, wives, immediate families, and
those under the control of insiders may also be regarded as
insiders. Where acquisition or other negotiations are
concerned, the above relationships apply to the other parties to
the negotiations as well. Finally, for the purpose of
Exchange's disclosure policies, insiders include "tippees" who
come into possession of material inside information.' 8
Similarly, a general conceptual description of insider trading is given in
section 340(3)(b):
(i) Insider trading refers not only to the purchase or sale of a
company's securities, but also to the purchase or sale of puts,
calls, or other options with respect to such securities. Such
trading is deemed to be done by an insider whenever he has
any beneficial interest, direct or indirect, in such securities or
options, regardless of whether they are actually held in his
name or not.
(ii) Included in the concept of insider trading is tipping, or
revealing insider information to outside individuals to enable
such individuals to trade in the company's securities on the
basis of undisclosed information.19
C. Prevention of Insider Trading
1. The Common Law Approach
Insider dealing occurs where an individual or organization buys or
sells securities and is knowingly in possession of some piece of confidential
information which is not generally available, which is price sensitive, and
which is likely, if generally available, to affect materially the price of the
securities. 20 The term "insider trading" has been introduced into common
law countries in light of the American experience. It indicates that before a
transaction can be deemed insider dealing, it must involve an improper use
18 KLSE Listing Requirement § 340(I)(a)-(b).
19 Id
20 Council for the Securities Industry Statement 3 (Oct. I1, 1978).
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of specific confidential and price sensitive information by directors and
others. The information must be obtained by virtue of their position in the
company so as to make a pecuniary advantage or to avoid a loss for them-
selves at the expense of other ill-informed shareholders or investors.
The cornerstone of the common law control of insider trading
emanates from the oft-quoted and much criticized case of Percival v.
Wright,21 in which certain shareholders wrote to the secretary of the
company asking if he knew any one disposed to purchase shares.
Negotiations took place and eventually the chairman of the company and
two other directors purchased the shares at 121. 10s. per shares. It was
subsequently discovered that prior to and during their own negotiations for
sale, the chairman and the board had been approached by a third party with
a view of purchasing the entire undertaking of the company at prices which
represented considerably more than 121 10s. per share. In any event, the
negotiations with the take-over bidder were aborted.
The shareholders asked to have the sale of their shares to the chair-
man and the other two directors set aside on the ground that the defendants
as directors ought to have disclosed the negotiations with the takeover
bidder when treating for the purchase of the plaintiffs' shares. But, the
court dismissed their action on the ground that the directors were under no
obligation to disclose to their vendor shareholders the negotiations which
ultimately proved abortive. Hence, the court held that there was no question
of unfair dealing. The director did not approach the shareholders, but it was
the share holders who approached the directors.
The directors, no doubt, owe their fiduciary duties to the company.
This, however, does not mean that directors can never stand in fiduciary
relationship to the members. They may owe fiduciary duties to the share
holders if they are authorized by them to negotiate on their behalf.
22
However, the Percival v. Wright rule was severely criticized by the
Cohen committee23 and has been forthrightly rejected by the Jenkins
committee. 24 They recommended the adoption of a rule which comes close
to the American rule lOb-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which has virtually placed directors in a fiduciary relationship to all those
with whom they have dealings in their companies' securities.
21 Percival v. Wright, 2 Ch. 421 (1902).
22 L.C.B. GOWER, THE PRINCIPLE OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 517 (K.W. Wedderbum & 0. Weaver
eds., 3d ed. 1969).
23 Cohen Comm. Rep. (Cand. 6659) 86, 87.
24 Jenkins Comm. Rep. (Cand. 1749) 89.
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The Supreme Court of New Zealand challenged Percival v. Wright in
Coleman v. Myers.25 In this case, the share holders brought an action
against the directors claiming, inter alia, rescission of the sale of shares by
them to the latter since the transaction was effected at a gross under-valu-
ation by means of a calculated plan. This, in effect, enabled the director to
reimburse to himself the initial acquisition expenses. Mohan, J., finding for
the defendant, was nevertheless of the view that Percival v. Wright was
wrongly decided and ought not to be followed. The decision of Percival v.
Wright might no longer fit the complexity and sophistication of modem life
in commerce as against the backdrop of the early 20th century when the
doctrine of laissez-faire was much advocated and where the whole pattem
of business transaction was different from the existing one.
It is thus doubtful if any future case would be decided in the same
way as Percival v. Wright. As Lord Wilberforce stated when referring to
Percival v. Wright in 1966, "This decision was no doubt good traditional
equity but when generalized, as it has been, was surely bad economics and
as the American Courts showed in 195526 with a little more flexibility these
two need not go together." 27
It is evident that at common law directors are not given an unquali-
fied prerogative to deal in the company's securities without any duty to
disclose to share holders any information affecting the prices of securities.
Thus, the courts invented various devices like the principle of uberrimae
fidei, constructive trust, breach of confidence, and the principle of unjust
enrichment to prevent the investors and creditors from being maltreated by
dishonest and incompetent controllers. But all these devices, in the modem
set-up, have not proved to be very effective to check the misuse of confi-
dential, price sensitive information. Although the hardship of Percival v.
Wright was mitigated by these devices, the aggrieved parties of the insider
trading still did not find these devices sufficient to protect them from the
rising and increasing evil of insider trading. A short account of all these
devices would be helpful for understanding the infirmities of such devices
which paved the way to taking some effective measures for the prevention
of insider trading.
25 Barry A.K. Rider, Percival v. Wright-Per Incuriam, 40 M.L.R. 471, 471 (1977).
26 His Lordship was referring to Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (1955).
27 L.J.C. Wilberforce, Law and Economics, 1966 J.B.L. 301,307 (1966).
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a. Principle of uberrimaefidei.
The first and most obvious obligation of persons in a fiduciary posi-
tion is to act with honesty. The greatest good faith is expected in the
discharge of their duties, 28 and good faith requires that all their endeavors
must be directed to the benefit of the company. Thus, where an insider uses
corporate information received by virtue of his office for personal gains, he
is obliged to disgorge the profits to the company since he is under a fiduci-
ary duty to the company not to utilize inside information improperly.
Similarly, D.N. Hossie stated as follows:
A director who acquires property while in office will, however,
be liable to account for his profit upon sale if two elements are
present. He must have acquired property only by reason of the
fact that he was a director and in the course of the exercise of
the office of director. 29
The scope of fiduciary duties contain the following three dimensions:
(1) interest of the company; 30 (2) conflict of duty and interest;3 1 and (3)
proper purpose, i.e., utilization of the property of the company for proper
purpose.32
Fiduciary duties are owed to the company and to the company alone.
In other words, one can say that the directors owe no duties to the individual
members as such or to a person who has not yet become a member, such as
a potential purchaser of the company's shares. 33 This principle is based on
the Percival v. Wright case, which has been criticized34 and even rejected. 35
28 See Bank of Poona Ltd. v. Nazayandas, 1961 A.I.R. 252, 253 (Bombay H.C. 1961).
29 D.N. Hossie, The Civil Liability of the Directors of a Corporation, 30 CAN. B.R. 908, 916 (1952).
See Companies Act § 132 (5).
30 On the topic of a company's interest and the company's interest alone see In re W. & M. Roith
Ltd., I All E.R. 427 (1967); Walker v. Wimborne, 137 C.L.R. (Austl. 1975); Parke v. Daily News Ltd.,
1962 Ch. 927 (1962).
31 On the topic of conflict of duty and interest see Chua Boon Chin v. McCormack, 2 M.L.J. 156,
158 (H.C. Sing. 1979); Furs Ltd. v. Tomkies, 54 C.L.R. 583, 592 (Austl. 1935); Boardman v. Phipp, 2 A.C.
46, 123 (H.L. 1967); In re City Equitable Fire Ins. Ltd., 1925 Ch. 407, 426 (1925); Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v.
Gulliver, I All E.R. 378 (1942); Mahesan v. Malaysia Gov't Officers Coop. Hous. Soc'y, I M.L.J. 149
(P.C. on Appeal from Malaysia 1978).
32 On the topic of utilization of a company's property or assets for proper purpose see Steen v. Law,
3 All E.R. 770, 775 (P.C. on Appeal from New South Wales 1963).
33 Percival v. Wright, 2 Ch. 421 (1902).
34 Cmnd 6659 86, 87.
35 Cmnd 1749 89.
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The directors can, therefore, stand in a fiduciary relationship to the
members. Moreover, if they make a personal profit as a result of inside
information in the company's dealings, they will commit a breach of their
fiduciary duty to the company and be liable to account for it.36 This prin-
ciple has placed the directors in a fiduciary relationship to all those with
whom they have dealings in their company's securities which is inconsistent
with the rule of Percival v. Wright. The Jenkins Committee, therefore,
recommended that:
a director ... who, in any transaction relating to the securities
of his company or of any other company in the same group,
makes improper use of a particular piece of confidential infor-
mation which might be expected materially to affect the value
of those securities, should be liable to compensate a person
who suffers from his action in so doing unless that information
was known to that person. 37
In the operation of such provision, much will depend on how the courts
interpret the word "improper." Furthermore, when the transaction was
effected on the Stock Exchange, it may, as the Committee recognizes, 38 be
difficult for the other party to establish that he was dealing with a director.
b. The doctrine of constructive trust.
The narrowly based fiduciary relationship theory paved the way to a
constructive trust relationship between the director, third parties, and the
company in respect to a misappropriation of a corporate opportunity.39
Thus, in Regal (Hastings) Limited v. Gulliver,40 the company sued the
former directors, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty for the secret profits
made while effecting the sale of the corporation. The court held that the
directors were in a fiduciary relationship to the appellant company and
therefore were liable.4 1 L.S. Sealy is of the view that the case would have
36 See the American Securities Exchange Act Rule l0b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1994), made under
The Securities Exchange Act, 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1988).
37 Cmnd. 1749 99(b).
38 Id. I 9(b).
39 See Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Craddock, 2 All E.R. 1073 (1968).
40 Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, I All E.R. 378 (1942).
41 Id.
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been decided in the same way had it been argued that the profits made by
the directors on the sale of the shares were corporate property belonging in
equity to the company and that the directors were, therefore, constructive
trustees. Each of the defendants could then be held jointly and severally
liable.42
The courts may reach the same conclusion by the application of the
doctrine of uberrimae fidei and the principle of constructive trust, yet an
action founded on the notion of a constructive trust would avail the plaintiff
of proprietary remedies which are far superior to remedies available on a
suit instituted on a personal duty to account for the secret profits. In the
case of a constructive trust, a basis for a tracing claim is provided, while the
same is not conferred on a secret profit claim which is also subject to the
statute of limitation.
The doctrine of constructive trust is a part of the larger fiduciary rela-
tionship. Professor Gower, in support of the fine distinction between the
two, observed that since "information is certainly often treated as property,"
then in almost every case in which directors are liable to account for profits,
there will have been a use of the company's property.43
This submission, of course, assumes that information is without doubt
corporate property. But whether information would inevitably be deemed a
corporate property or an opportunity belonging in equity to the company is
far from settled law. The better view in Boardman v. Phipps,44 and in
particular that of Lord UpJohn, 45 would seem to be that prima facie, infor-
mation would generally not be regarded as corporate property and therefore,
a fiduciary is at liberty to use it for his own benefit without, at the same
time, incurring his principal in any detriment. It might, however, not be the
case if it is confidential information given to him in the circumstances
which will import a breach of confidence if it is subsequently divulged to a
third party.
c. Breach of confidence
The principle of breach of confidence also provides a vehicle for the
control of insider trading. In Dunford & Elliot Ltd. v. Johnson & Firth
42 L.S. SEALY, CASES AND MATERIAL IN COMPANY LAW 253 (2d ed.).
43 L.C.B. GOWER, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 608 (4th ed. 1979).
44 Boardman v. Phipps, 2 A.C. 46 (1967).
45 Id. at 127-28.
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Brown Ltd. ,46 the plaintiff company, contemplating a rights issue, suggested
to the institutional shareholders (the "consortium") that they should under-
write the issue. A report relating to the plaintiff's financial prospect was
prepared and given to the consortium only. It proposed that the defendant
company should be invited to participate in the underwriting scheme and
the report was then shown to the defendant company. The Court of Appeal
held that an injunction restraining the defendant company from making a
takeover bid would not be granted since the plaintiff's own directors had
made considerable use themselves of the information. The court was never-
theless of the view that there had been an unauthorized use by the defendant
company of the plaintiff company's financial report with the necessary
quality of confidence.
The decision has been criticized on the grounds that the protection,
which from the outset was available to the company, ought not to be with-
drawn on the mere fact that the directors had misused the information. A
more logical basis for the decision has been suggested to be that the already
generally available information was in fact not confidential.4 7 As it now
stands, the decision introduces an element of uncertainty relating to the
scope of the law of confidence, and at the same time creates an impression
that there is reluctance on the part of the judiciary to intervene.
d. Unjust enrichment principle
The law of unjust enrichment may perhaps be involved to extend the
parameters relating to insider trading. This unfamiliar and general principle
which is incapable of having a precise definition is somewhat akin to the
principle of "restitution." Its scope embraces situations where there is a
transfer of property or services resulting from a mistake or coercion, and for
the purpose of insider trading, where a person is in breach of fiduciary duty.
Any indulgence in insider trading involves pecuniary advantages to the
insider. The doctrine could thus facilitate the plaintiff to base his remedy on
the grounds that: "He has a right to have restored to him a benefit gained at
his expense by another, if the retention of the benefit by the other would be
unjust."4 8
46 Dunford & Elliot Ltd. v. Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd., 1977 Lloyd's Rep. 505 (1977).
47 Barry A.K. Rider, Abuse ofInside Information, 127 N.L.J. 830, 832.
48 Warren A. Seavey and Austin W. Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q.R. 29, 32 (1938).
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However, the plaintiff has to fulfill certain requirements before
appropriate relief on this principle can be granted. He has to show that the
defendant had been enriched by the receipt of an advantage at the former's
expense, and that it would be unjust to allow a retention of such benefit to
subsist.49 An illustration of such a liability is the case of Canadian Aero
Service Ltd. v. O'Malley. The plaintiff company brought an action against
the directors of the company for improperly and wrongfully taking the
benefit of the company's mapping and surveying contract with the
Government of Guyana in breach of a fiduciary duty. Larkin, J., held that
the defendants were liable for misuse of corporate opportunity and the
remedy took the form of an award of damages based on unjust enrichment
instead of an accounting of profits.
The foregoing discussion shows that the concept of fiduciary duty,
which has its roots in common law, does not take account of the realities of
business life relating to takeovers and mergers in interlocking directorates
and associated companies in which financial journalists, securities brokers,
issuing houses, underwriters, and merchant brokers play an ever increasing
role. Meanwhile Percival v. Wright seems to confine itself only to directors
of companies. No doubt a company can penalize its errant directors who
misuse corporate information, but other users of such information will
escape the meshes of common law.
Further, if the board of directors of a company decides not to proceed
against an errant director, the latter will go scot-free. 50 In view of the
practical difficulties caused by the narrow interpretation of the principle of
good faith in Percival v Wright and the proper plaintiff rule in Foss v.
Barbottle, a person who wants to sue is therefore left with hardly any choice
but to seek the aid of the legislature.
2. Statutory Approach
Insider trading in Malaysia is regulated by a complex network of
legislative provisions. These provisions include the Companies Act
("CA"), the Securities Industry Act ("SIA") the Futures Industry Act
("FIA"), and Securities Commission Act,5 1 and the Securities Industry
49 Gareth Jones, Unjust Enrichment andthe Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty, 84 L.Q.R. 472, 472 (1968).
50 PHILIP L.R. MITCHELL, INSIDER DEALING AND DIRECTOR'S DUTIES 195 (2d ed. 1989).
51 A brief account is given of Securities Commission Act, 1993 under a separate heading "New
Developments: Statutory Framework," which was not included in the earlier article of the author on
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(Central Depository) Act ("SI (CD) A"). We have classified the relevant
provisions of the various statutes as follows:
Table C
Provisions directly controlling unfair activities of insiders:
Description of Activity
General duty of honesty
Prohibition against use of "insider
information"
Liabilities of officers in dealing with
securities
Prohibition on abuse of information
obtained in official capacity
Prohibition of loans to persons
connected with directors
Substantial property transactions
involving directors
Prohibition on stock market manipula-
tion and use of deceptive devices
Prohibition on dissemination of false or
misleading information
Prohibition of fraudulent inducement of
persons to deal in securities
Prohibition on abuse of information
obtained in official capacity
Short selling
Illegal trading
Restrictions on establishment of a central
depository and other restrictions
Duties of Central Depository
Prohibition against trading of securities
withdrawn from a central depository
Restriction on disclosure of information
by authorized depository agents
Controlling Provision
CA § 132(1)
CA § 132(2)
CA § 132A
BCA § 132
CA § 133A
CA § 132E
SIA §§ 85, 87A
SIA § 86
SIA § 87
SIA § 90
SIA § 41(1)
SIA §§ 12, 13
SI(CD)A §§ 44, 47-50
SI(CD)A §§ 8-10, 12, 27
SI(CD)A § 23
SI(CD)A § 44
"Insider Trading: Prevention and Cure" because the same was written before the establishment of the
Securities Commission in 1993.
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SI(CD)A § 51
Rule 30 of the Malaysian
Code on Takeovers and
Mergers
KLSE listing requirement
§ 340
Table D
Provisions indirectly controlling insider activities through disclosure:
Description of Activity
Registration of substantial share
holdings
Registration of director's interest
Registration of the interest of stock
brokers, investment advisors and
financial journalists
Disclosure of interest
Registration of license holders
Registration of securities
Certain persons to disclose certain
interest in securities
Duty of central depository to keep
certain records
Record of an entry, primafacie
evidence
Controlling Provision
CA § 135
CA §§ 134-35
CA §§ 26-35
SCA § 13
SIA § 26
SIA § 30
SIA § 39
SI(CD)A § 27
SI(CD)A § 33
Table E
Provisions indirectly controlling activities of insiders
through investigation and enforceability
Description of Activity
Inspector appointed by Minister
Controlling Provision
CA Part IX §§ 193-210
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Enforcement and investigation by SIA Part IX §§ 94-99
Registrar
Power of courts to make certain SIA § 100
orders
Enforcement and investigation (by SCA § 39
their own inspectors)
Conduct of prosecution SCA § 39
Investigation (by Registrar) SI(CD)A §§ 52-58
Disciplinary power of the Articles of Association, Art. 27;
Committee of Stock Exchange Rules relating to member firms and
member companies of the KLSE,
Rule 8
The purpose of these provisions is to protect both the tangible and
intangible property of the company from being misused by insiders.
However, dealing with intangible property raises conceptual problems
which must be understood at the outset. If an employee absconds with the
only set of a company's technical plans his conduct would amount to theft
of a piece of valuable tangible property. This is the same as a burglar
stealing an old masterpiece from a museum. Suppose, however, that other
sets of these plans exist; that it is the information on them, rather than the
paper itself, which has value that the company is trying to protect. Since
theft implies the wrongful appropriation of property in respect of which
another person has asserted exclusive ownership rights, it might be inferred
that the company was the owner of the information concerned. This is not
so, since absconding with the plans still leaves the company with the benefit
of other copies of them for future use. What has been destroyed in the
hypothetical is the exclusivity of the information. Thus, property status has
been attributed to information at the highest level. 52
The codification of the provisions and the establishment of the
Securities Commission in 1993 for the prevention of insider trading is clear
evidence that Malaysia has moved towards regulating its securities industry.
Below, an effort will be made to ascertain the application of some legal
provisions particularly sections 132, 132A, and 132B of the CA. A brief
reference will also be made to sections 89A, 89A, and 90 of the SIA.
Section 132(1) of the CA has been taken from a similar provision in
an Australian act that has no counterpart in English legislation. It provides
52 See Boardman v. Phipps, 2 AC 46 (1976), 3 All E.R. 721 (1966).
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that: "A director shall at all times act honestly and use reasonable diligence
in the discharge of the duties of his office." It may be noted from the very
outset that CA section 132(1) does not purport to be an exhaustive statement
of directors' duties; section 132(5) specifically provides that the section 53 is
in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other rule of law relating to the
duty or liability of directors or officers of a company. Accordingly, cases
reflecting the common law and equitable rules relating to the duty of
directors are still relevant.
The word "honestly" in the above provision covers a multitude of
rules evolved over the last century or so, regarding what are classed by the
textbook writers as directors' fiduciary duties. These can be reduced to
three basic propositions. 54 First, a director must act in what he honestly
considers to be the company's interest, and not in the interest of some other
person or persons55 Second, a director must not place himself in a position
where his duties to the company and his personal interest may conflict.56
Third, a director must employ the powers and assets that he is entrusted
with for the purpose for which they were given and not for any other
collateral purpose.
The scope of the section may be summarized in the following words
of Gowans, J., who stated:
the background to the language of the section appears to justify
the conclusions, first, that the section is not concerned with the
conduct of the director in relation to creditors or other persons
dealing with or concerned with the company or anybody else
but the company itself, secondly, that it is concerned with the
performance of his fiduciary duty to the company, and thirdly,
that to act 'honestly' refers to acting bona fide in the interests
of the company in the performance of the functions attaching to
the office of the director . . . . In effect, the common law
obligation to act with due diligence has been made a statutory
duty and failure to perform it, provided there is a proper mental
element, has been made a criminal offense. 57
53 Id
5 4 See also supra notes 30, 31 & 32 on fiduciary duties of directors.
55 Chua Boon Chin v. McCormarck, 2 M.L.J. 156 (H.C. Sing. 1979).
56 Id.
57 Marchesi v. Barnes, 1970 V.R. 434, 438 (1970).
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Perhaps the principle of 'honesty' provides the cogent reason for the control
of insider trading. The arguments in favor of insider trading-that the inno-
cent investors are not affected or that too much power vested in
enforcement agencies may give rise to an autocratic bureaucracy-are not
acceptable these days. For a market like Malaysia, which is dependent
largely on ordinary individual investors, insider trading, if allowed to
prevail, will have the effect of driving away the individual investors. The
Malaysian Stock Market cannot afford to allow dishonest practices to go
unpunished. Insider trading should be treated as dishonest conduct.
Section 132(2) of the CA has been enacted as a measure of reform of
civil remedies. It appears that the legislators intended civil and criminal
sanctions for insider dealing. Thus, the extension of criminal liability may
enable the court, in addition to or in substitution of the statutory penalty, to
order the person convicted to account for his profits or profits that his
tippees have made. Thus, it has clearly rendered the use of insider informa-
tion by officers of the company and officers of the Stock Exchange illegal.
The CA provides:
An officer or agent of a company or officer of the Stock
Exchange shall not make improper use of any information
acquired by virtue of his position as an officer or agent of the
company or officer of the Stock Exchange to gain directly or
indirectly an advantage for himself or for any other person or to
cause detriment to the company.58
It is clear from the above provision that the hardship of the rule in Percival
v. Wright59 has been mitigated to a large extent. Section 132(3) provides a
criminal and a civil remedy for the breach of the provision of section 132(2)
as follows:
An officer or officer of the Stock Exchange who commits a
breach of this section shall be (a) liable to the company for any
profit made by him or for any damage suffered by the company
as a result of the breach; and (b) guilty of an offence against
58 CA § 132(2).
59 Supra note 32.
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this Act. Penalty: Imprisonment for five years or thirty
thousand ringgit.60
It is significant that the aggrieved company may sue for any profit made by
the offending insider even though, as will usually be the case, the company
may not have suffered any detriment. Liability is also extended if the
company can demonstrate that it suffered damage as a result of the breach.
It would appear that if the company can show that the breach had caused a
loss of confidence by the company's customers or creditor, the company
could sue for damages regardless of any proof of benefit accruing to the
offending officer as consequence of his inside dealings. 6 1
Thus, the scope of CA section 132(2) has been extended beyond
directors to include an officer or agent as well as persons who have previ-
ously held such positions. The ambit of the word agent has been extended
to include a banker, advocate, solicitor, auditor, accountant or stock broker
of a corporation and any person who is, or at any time in the preceding six
months has been, knowingly connected with the corporation. 62
The defect of this provision is that persons such as dealers, invest-
ment analysts, and financial journalists might be excluded in cases of
insider trading. The problem becomes more acute when one attempts to
interpret the character of information. The construction simply shows that
although the information "need not be secret and confidential, it must be
information acquired by virtue of his position as an officer." On the other
hand, in construing section 124(2) of the Australian Uniform Companies
Act (which is similar to CA section 132(2)) Bust, J., observed that "such
information need not be secret but it must necessarily be confidential." 63
Section 132A(1) of the CA deals with the law relating to dealings by
officers in securities. Section 132A(6) provides for a penalty of imprison-
ment for five years or thirty thousand ringgit or both. In section 132(3), the
penalty is imprisonment for five years or thirty thousand ringgit, whereas in
section 132(6) the penalty is imprisonment for five years or thirty thousand
ringgit or both. These provisions show the gravity of the offense under
section 132A(1), which provides:
60 CA § 132(3).
61 AFTERMAN, COMPANY DIRECTORS AND CONTROLLERS 115 (1970).
62 CA § 132(6).
63 AWTHER SINGH, I COMPANY LAW OF SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA 222.
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An officer, agent or employee of a corporation or officer of the
Stock Exchange who in or in relation to a dealing in securities
of the corporation by himself or any other person makes
improper use to gain, directly or indirectly, an advantage for
himself or any other person of specific confidential information
acquired by virtue of his position as such officer, agent or
employee or officer of the Stock Exchange which if generally
known might reasonably be expected to affect materially the
price of the subject matters of the dealing on a Stock Exchange
shall, in addition to any penalty imposed under subsection (6),
be liable to any person for loss suffered by that person by
reason of the payment by him or to him or a consideration in
respect of the securities greater or lesser, as the case may be,
than the consideration that would have been reasonable if the
information had been generally known at the time of the
dealing.64
The object of section 132A(1), which is identical to section 124A of the
Australian Uniform Company Code of 1971, is to alter the law as declared
in Percival v. Wright. Thus, an officer who makes use of confidential
information either to buy shares which he expects will rise in value when
the information is released, or to sell shares which he expects to fall in value
when the information becomes known, has gained an improper advantage
from his position and should be accountable in some way to the extent of
that advantage. It is evident that section 132A(1) strictly prohibits insider
trading. It imposes liability on an officer which is broader than section 132
of the CA as it extends to a liability to compensate any person who suffered
a loss as a result of the insider trading.
To understand the scope of liability, refer to rule 30 of the 1987
Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers, which provides:
Rule 30: Secrecy and Insider Dealing
30.1 All persons privy to confidential price sensitive infor-
mation concerning an offer or contemplated offer must treat
that information as secret and must not pass it to any other
person unless it is necessary to do so. No person who is privy
64 CA § 132A(I).
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to such information should make any recommendation to any
other persons as to dealing in the relevant securities. All such
persons must conduct themselves as to minimize the chances of
an accidental leak of information.
30.2 No dealing of any kind . . . in the securities of the
offeree company by any person, not being the offeror, who is
privy to confidential price sensitive information concerning an
offer or contemplated offer may take place between the time
when there is reason to suppose that an approach or an offer is
contemplated and the announcement of the approach or offer or
of the termination of the discussion.
30.3 No such dealings shall take place in the securities of the
offeror except where the proposed offer is not deemed price
sensitive in relation to such securities.
The only shortcoming in the provision of section 132A subsection (3)
of CA and section 89 of the SIA is the limitation period that allows the
defaulting insider to be free of liability two years after the insider trading
occurred. It is submitted that the period of limitation should commence
only after the misuse of the price sensitive information is discovered.
Hence, the provision of section 29 of the Limitation Act of 1953 should be
applied as it is applied in most of the cases relating to fraud. In such cases,
the limitation period commences only after discovery of the fraud in
question.
Another section, 132A(6), addresses the nature and scope of inside
information. The following are the ingredients to make the accused liable
under section 132 A(6): (1) The person (accused) must be an officer, agent
or employee of a corporation or officer of the Stock Exchange, (2) who
makes improper use of the information in or in relation to a dealing in
securities of a corporation; (3) the information must be used to gain direct
or indirect advantage for the accused or any other person; (4) the informa-
tion must have been acquired by virtue of the accused's position as an
officer; and (5) the information must be such that, if generally known, it
might reasonably be expected to affect materially the price of the subject
matter of the dealing on a Stock Exchange, i.e., the price sensitive informa-
tion. Moreover, the information must be specific confidential information.
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The phrase "specific confidential information" is not free from ambi-
guity. The courts have tried to explain the meaning of the phrase in various
cases. In the Singaporean case of Public Prosecutor v. Chaudhry,65 the
accused was found guilty of making use of confidential information that a
public trading company of which he was the chairman and chief executive
"was facing a financial crisis" when he dealt with the securities by dispos-
ing 360,000 shares in a number of transactions. Sinnathuray, J., observed:
"it is a question of fact in each case to be resolved on the evidence adduced
at the hearing of the case as to what is specific confidential information."
However, his lordship was of the view that in the phrase specific
confidential information the word "specific" is used in contradiction to
"general" or "not specific." 66 Hence, information means knowledge of a
particular event or situation such as advice, communication, intelligence,
news, notification, and the like.67 In another case,6 8 specific information
was interpreted as information having an existence of its own quite apart
from the operation of any process of deduction. Thus, the specific informa-
tion must be capable of being pointed to and identified, and must be capable
of being expressed unequivocally. 69
The phrase "specific information" assumed much importance when
Public Prosecutor v. ChaudhryO was decided by the Court of Appeals. In
this case, the accused was convicted and sentenced to nine months impris-
onment. On appeal, he contended that the phrase "facing a financial crisis"
was too general to come within the meaning of specific information under
section 132A(1). The judge, Rajah, J., allowed the appeal on the ground
that:
whether a company is facing a financial crisis is a matter of
opinion which one deduces after having looked at matters
relating to the finances of a company, its management and the
support it receives from its bankers. What might strike one as
constituting a financial crisis need not strike another in the
same way. In other words, this is a matter of opinion or of
65 Public Prosecutor v. Chaudhry, I M.L.J. 76 (1981).
66 The interpretation is given on the basis of a case decided by the Ontario Court of Appeals in
Green v. Chapterhouse Group Canada Ltd., 68 D.L.R. (3d) 952 (1976).
67 Id
68 Ryan v. Triguboff, I A.C.L.R. 337, 345 (1976).
69 Id
70 Public Prosecutor v. Chaudhry, I M.L.J. 76 (1981).
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judgment. The phrase 'facing a financial crisis' is a subjective
statement and not an objective one, precisely or unequivocally
expressed.71
Subsequently, the Solicitor General brought the matter before the
Court of Criminal Appeals for determination on a point of law of public
interest.72 The issue was whether in law a company facing "a financial
crisis" could be described as having satisfied the term "specific informa-
tion." In reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court of
Criminal Appeals stated "facing a financial crisis is the kind of specific
information anyone familiar with the market knows that can markedly affect
the price of the particular shares and can result in the suspension of the
trading of the shares on the Stock Exchange. '73
The other term, "confidential," suggests that the information need not
be labeled as such. It is confidential if it is not meant for general dissemi-
nation. The yardstick by which one can measure whether dissemination has
taken place on a general scale would be the circulation of the information
beyond the board room. To be confidential, the information must be such
that if it is generally known it might reasonably be expected to materially
affect the price of the subject matter of the dealing on a stock exchange.
The provision is confined so long as the transaction relates to the securities
of a company that are listed on a stock exchange.
It may be recalled that a major defect under section 132A(1) of the
Companies Act is that "tippees" could trade on their acquired information
with impunity. In Public Prosecutor v. Allan Ng Poh Meng,74 the district
court judge dismissing the contention of the defense, and emphasized the
applicability of the objective test, stating:
If an insider has any doubt about the legitimacy of dealing
while in possession of information acquired, by reason ... of
being a connected person, then he should not deal. He should
not deal because his doubts are . . . telling him that the
information may well have a price impact.75
71 Chaudhry v. Public Prosecutor, 2 M.L.J. 231,232 (1980).
72 This is provided by virtue of § 60 of The Singapore Supreme Court of Judiciature Act (Cap 157).
73 Chaudhry, I M.L.J. at 79.
74 Public Prosecutor v. Allan Ng Poh Meng, I M.L.J. v (1990).
75 Id.
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In Public Prosecutor v. Allan76 the accused was a prominent busi-
nessman. He was approached by officers of Standard Chartered Merchant
Bank Asia Ltd. ("SCMBA") with a view of acquiring a stake in Sealion
Hotels, Ltd. ("SHL"), a public company, whose trading was suspended at
that time. The accused was informed by SCMBA that the suspension would
be lifted soon. The accused purchased one million SHL shares from Felix
Lim. The accused was charged with insider trading as a tippee, was
convicted, and sentenced to a period of twelve months imprisonment. The
court did not accept the argument of the accused that section 103(3) of the
SIA of Singapore applied only if there was an arrangement between natural
persons to communicate price sensitive information with a view to dealing
in securities. The court held that the section applied equally to corporations
as well as to natural persons.
On the question of the mitigation of punishment, the court observed
that:
a sentence imposed must not only fit the offence but must be
individualised to fit the offender.... [T]he offence is a grave
one. The measure of its gravity is reflected in the punishment
provided for it, namely, a fine of up to RM50,000 or impris-
onment of up to seven years. He committed the offence in
circumstances that makes his conduct reprehensible and
deserving of a sentence not only to convince him ...but to
serve as a warning to others never to entertain thoughts of
indulging in similar escapades. 77
The provision of section 132A(2) provides that "an officer ... shall
not be liable under subsection (1) to a person for any loss suffered by that
person if that person knows or ought reasonably to have known of the
information referred to in subsection (1) before entering into a transaction
relating to the dealing in securities of the corporation. 78 The application of
the provisions of the Limitation Act of 1953 has been restricted by the
provision of section 132A(3) for the recovery of the amount of a loss
76 Id
77 Id. at xii-xiv.
78 CA § 132A(2).
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referred to in such section (1) up to two years after the date of completion of
the dealing in securities in respect of which the loss was suffered.79
Section 132B deals with the prohibition on abuse of information
obtained in official capacity as follows:
Any person who ... has any information which if generally
known might reasonably be expected to affect materially the
price of the subject matter of the dealing on a Stock Exchange
and which (a) he holds by virtue of his official capacity or
former official capacity; (b) it would be reasonable to expect a
person in his official capacity or former official capacity not to
disclose except for the proper performance of the functions
attaching to that official capacity; and (c) he knows is unpub-
lished price-sensitive information in relation to securities of the
corporation, shall not make improper use of such information
to gain, directly or indirectly, an advantage for himself or for
any other person and any person who contravenes or fails to
comply with the provisions of this section commits an
offence. 80
The information referred to in this section is unpublished price sensitive
information which, unlike section 132A, may or may not be specific confi-
dential information. The information must, however, be held by the person
concerned by virtue of his official capacity which he presently holds or in
the past held. Another feature that contrasts with section 132A is that no
offense is committed unless the person knows that the information is
unpublished price sensitive information. With regard to the penalty, both
provisions provide the same punishment.
With the establishment of the Securities Commission in 1993, it is
evident that Malaysia has moved positively towards regulating the nation's
securities industry. The Market Supervision Division of the Commission,
with the help of the Surveillance and Compliance Department, including the
Investigation and Enforcement Department, is investigating improper or
prohibited market practices such as illegal trading, short selling, market
manipulation, and insider trading. The chairman of the Commission is
79 CA § 132B.
80 Supra note 23, 5.
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empowered to appoint any of its officers to conduct the prosecution in the
above quoted improper or prohibited market practices.
During the period of March, 1993, to December, 1993, the commis-
sion prosecuted five short selling cases of UPHB shares under section 41(1)
of the SIA. All the accused persons pleaded guilty to the charge and paid
the fines as imposed by the respective courts, 81 as shown in Table B.
Apart from the convictions in short selling cases, the commission has
issued public reprimands to three errant companies during the period
covered by the 1993 First Annual Report for their wrong statements
regarding the variance in the estimated or forecast pretax profit and actual
pretax profit, 82 along with many other shortcomings as shown in Table A.
The conviction of the five short selling cases and the public reprimands
issued to three errant companies within a short period of ten months is
evidence of the timely establishment of the Securities Commission in
Malaysia.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that courts and legisla-
tures are keeping a vigilant watch over unscrupulous company controllers.
But it does not mean that companies are constantly embroiled in internecine
strife, or that investors and creditors are routinely maltreated by dishonest or
incompetent company controllers. Nothing could be further from the truth.
On the contrary, "the great majority of limited companies, both public and
private, are honestly and conscientiously managed." 83 We have tried to
consider the extent to which the legal rules are conducive to this desirable
result and provide adequate redress in the case of the small number of
companies less scrupulously operated. We submit the following to meet
with the situations in future cases of insider trading:
(1) The provision of section 132(1) of the Companies Act should be read
with the provision of section 132(5), as section 132(1) is in addition to and
not in derogation of any other rule of law relating to the duty or liability of
directors or officers of a company. Hence, cases reflecting the common law
in this field should still be relevant.
81 See supra note 9, at 66.
82 See supra note 9, at. 53.
83 Supra note 23, 5.
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(2) First, section 132(2) should be treated as the reversal of the notorious
common law judgment of Percival v. Wright. The provision is confined
only to the injury caused to the company, but the scope is extended from
directors to officers of the company, stock exchange, or agent as well as
those who previously held such office. It is submitted that persons such as
dealers, investment analysts, public servants, financial journalists, and
tippees should also be included within the scope of section 132(2).
Secondly, the word "information" is very broad. It is therefore submitted
that the meaning of the word information should be limited to "confidential
information" in the provision of section 132(1), as in section 124(2) of the
Australian Uniform Companies Act.
(3) Section 132A(1) strictly prohibits insider trading in dealing with
securities. The liability in section 132A(1) is broader than the liability in
section 132(1) of the Companies Act, as it is extended to compensate any
person who suffered a loss as a result of insider trading in securities. The
traditional rule of proper plaintiff as applied in Foss v. Harbottle should not
be applied here. Moreover, the provision of section 132A(3) should be
seriously considered for modification so as to provide the extension of the
period of limitation which should commence from the date the information
is discovered, as opposed to the existing provision "from the date of
dealing." The amendment should be enacted as: "The action for the recov-
ery may be commenced for a period of two years from the date the
knowledge of the misuse of information comes into light." This would be
like any other case of fraud. The existing provision makes the defaulter free
from potential liability two years after the act of insider trading.
(4) The phrase "specific confidential information" should not be
construed literally. An objective test should be laid down to ascertain the
nature of information. A liberal interpretation should be given to the words
"confidential."
(5) Section 132B(l) does not deal with specific confidential information
like section 132A(1), but rather with information obtained in the official
capacity of, and abused by, the officer concerned. It is provided that no
offense shall be committed if the person knows that the information is
published. But, it is very difficult to ascertain the subjective knowledge of
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the person concerned regarding whether information is unpublished. The
element of subjective knowledge should be excluded if the information is
really unpublished. It is immaterial whether the person knows or does not
know the fact of its being published and he should be made liable under
section 132B of the Companies Act regardless of his knowledge.
(6) The investigating authorities should be well versed in the corporate
law for the effective investigation into the offense of insider trading.
(7) The burden of proof should be shifted from the prosecution to the
defense to show that the information was not confidential price sensitive
information, and that it was not misused for the benefit of the accused or for
the benefit of the accused's tippees.
(8) As a watch dog of securities trading, and with a view of its globaliza-
tion, it is respectfully submitted that the Commission should be very
cautious in issuing public reprimands to the errant companies. Since the
Commission is an enforcing authority, the power of issuing public
reprimands should be guided by the principles of natural justice and fair
play.
(9) For the internationalization of securities industry and for the encour-
agement of the foreign investors, a rethinking of the following fields is
required: (a) tax revenue questions should keep pace with the principle of
reciprocity with other governments and the liberal economic policy of the
country; (b) pre-emption rights and the development of global equity
market; (c) special issue requirements under the National Development
Policy (NDP) regarding the Bumiputra equity participation and Alibaba
types of transactions.8 4
(10) Any relaxation in the regulation of in socio-economic offenses is
bound to open a floodgate of such offenses. It is therefore submitted that
the element of mens rea should not be considered in the offense of insider
trading, particularly in Malaysia, where the whole nation is committed to
Wawasan 2020 (Vision 2020), i.e., to place Malaysia in the categories of
fully developed and self sufficient nations of the world.
84 See Mohd Ishaque Qureshi, Share Transfer Restrictions: A Malaysian Exprerience, MALAYASIAN
LAW NEWS (M.L.N.), Nov. 1992, at 5-8; Dec. 1992, at 10-13; May, 1993, at 35-39.
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